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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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1 OF 1

8 NOV 1972

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# **TRENDS**

**In Communist Propaganda**

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8 NOVEMBER 1972  
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 45)


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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 30 OCTOBER - 5 NOVEMBER 1972

Moscow (2486 items)

Indochina	(19%)	13%
[Vietnam	(15%)	12%]
October Revolution	(2%)	11%
Anniversary		
PRAVDA Editorial Article	(--)	7%
on Publication of		
Brezhnev Works		
China	(3%)	4%
Algerian Revolution	(--)	3%
Anniversary		

Peking (1537 items)

Indochina	(21%)	52%
[Vietnam	(13%)	38%]
[Cambodia	(6%)	11%]
Domestic Issues	(37%)	25%
UNGA Session	(12%)	3%
UK Foreign Secretary	(--)	3%
in PRC		
Algerian Revolution	(--)	3%
Anniversary		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

Vietnamese communist media have continued to focus attention on alleged U.S. bad faith in failing to sign the U.S.-DRV draft peace agreement on 31 October, and for the most part have avoided discussing substantive issues apparently in dispute between the two sides. Sharply at variance with this pattern, however, an 8 November NHAN DAN editorial, in the course of an impassioned plea regarding the fate of political prisoners in South Vietnam, went beyond Hanoi's 26 October summary of the peace agreement when it insisted that the text clearly provides for the release of civilian as well as military prisoners in parallel with U.S. withdrawal. The editorial went on to say that Thieu's alleged stepped-up terrorism and U.S. shipment of war materiel to South Vietnam are actions contrary to the spirit and specific provisions of the agreement.

Also on the 8th, a statement by the PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman protested the shipment of war materiel and the dispatch to South Vietnam of "many U.S. officers in the guise of civilian advisers" and demanded a serious response to the DRV and PRG statements on the peace agreement. A communique adopted by an NFLSV-Vietnam Alliance joint conference on 1 and 2 November had praised the draft agreement and maintained that the Nixon Administration had been brought into "negotiations on substance" by the current offensive in South Vietnam as well as by the diplomatic efforts of the PRG and DRV.

In the fourth authoritative PRC commentary on Vietnam in five days, a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 3 November warned that if the United States presses for a modification of the agreement, the war will continue and peace will be postponed indefinitely.

Moscow's reticence in commenting on the delay in signing the U.S.-DRV peace accord was reflected in Mazurov's October Revolution anniversary speech, in which he failed to explicitly blame the United States. Mazurov merely expressed hope that the agreement would be signed "as soon as possible."

### DRV ASSAILS U.S. FOR FAILING TO SIGN, JEOPARDIZING ACCORD

The NHAN DAN editorial of the 8th which discussed the provisions in the peace agreement regarding the release of political prisoners marked a sharp departure by Hanoi media, which had studiously avoided the substance of the accord. Thus, Hanoi has ignored

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widespread press speculation about the need to further negotiate or to clarify such issues as the supervision of a cease-fire and its implementation throughout Indochina, the presence of North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam, and the nature and precise role of the three-segment administrative (chinh quyen) structure, called "National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord." Until the release of the editorial--by both Hanoi's domestic radio and VNA--the propaganda had a time-marking quality: While assailing the United States for failing to sign the accord on the 31st and insisting that there had been agreement on the draft text, Hanoi, by avoiding substance, seemed to be leaving its options open regarding possible revisions of the accord. The timing of the editorial suggests that Hanoi may not have wanted to engage in a substantive polemic until after the U.S. election.

Most notably, the editorial contained the first elaboration of the peace accord since Hanoi released its 26 October government statement. Repeating the standard charge that Thieu is persecuting the "patriots" imprisoned in South Vietnam, the editorial claimed that during the past two weeks, in 20,000 police operations, nearly 5,000 more people have been imprisoned and hundreds shot.

NHAN DAN declared that "we cannot talk about an end to the war while hundreds of thousands of patriots are still detained, tortured, or killed . . . ." And it said that this is the reason why the peace agreement "provides for the release of all captured patriots and military men and the civilian internees--meaning, according to provision 21 b of the Geneva Agreement, 'all persons who have in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties.'" Point three of Hanoi's summary had said that "the return of all captured and detained personnel of the parties shall be carried out in parallel [song song] with the U.S. troops' withdrawal." Hanoi seems to be disputing Kissinger's statement in his press conference of the 26th that there is a separate provision that the future of South Vietnamese civilians detained in South Vietnam should be determined through negotiations among the South Vietnamese parties. Kissinger had added that the return of U.S. prisoners is not conditional on the disposition of Vietnamese prisoners in Vietnamese jails on both sides of the conflict.

NHAN DAN said further that the situation in South Vietnam is also the reason why the agreement reached between Vietnam and the United States has clearly provided for guarantees of the democratic

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liberties of the South Vietnamese people. Point four of Hanoi's summary on self-determination in South Vietnam said cryptically that "democratic liberties of the people will be insured." President Thieu said in his 24 October TV speech that the communists, when asked what they meant by freedom and democracy, said: "We must have the right to conduct political activities, discuss politics, and propagandize anywhere and by any means; although we live in military areas and not in your areas, because of freedom of circulation, political freedom, and freedom of opinion and propaganda we must be allowed to go to the Saigon market to talk; we must have the right to publish as many papers as we want; there will be no law at all and, particularly, the wartime and martial laws must all be abolished."

NHAN DAN accused the United States of "deliberately delaying the signing and even attempting to renege on the terms it has agreed to." The editorial charged that the U.S. "massive" dispatch of war means to South Vietnam and Thieu's "repressive policies" in the South are actions completely against the spirit of the peace accord and in fact "seriously jeopardize the agreement itself." Hanoi's decision to discuss a sensitive substantive issue in this fashion could reflect pessimism regarding the likelihood of an early agreement. On the other hand, its comment may be calculated to mobilize world public opinion against Thieu's policies. The editorial observed that "a strong wave of world public opinion is rising to demand that the U.S.-Thieu clique release political prisoners immediately," and it said that international organizations have denounced Thieu's policies.

#### CRITICISM OF THE PRESIDENT

While earlier Hanoi propaganda had not discussed substantive issues in contention, comment pegged to President Nixon's 2 November TV campaign speech noted that he had referred to "central points" which need to be settled. Asking if this is preparation for an ultimate renunciation of U.S. commitments, a Hanoi broadcast on the 3d observed that while the President said he wants peace with honor, a peace fair to all and a peace that will last, it seems that the Administration in fact wants the Vietnamese to accept "a U.S.-style peace." The broadcast noted that while the President referred to "central points," Kissinger had said in his press conference of the 26th that the points needing further discussion were "minor." On 4 November Hanoi media carried the statement by the DRV spokesman in Paris on the 3d that pronouncements in the President's speech and by "other U.S. officials" since 26 October reveal the "unjustifiable pretexts" the United States has raised in failing to honor its commitments. And on the 5th Hanoi briefly reported that Xuan Thuy, in his interview with

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the New York TIMES' Flora Lewis, quoted directly from the President's and Premier Pham Van Dong's messages, noting that the President had said "the formulation of the agreement can be considered complete" and that Dong had agreed to the official signing on 31 October.\*

A 5 November NHAN DAN editorial pegged to the President's speech said it showed that the United States still wants to negotiate from a position of strength and that this "plot" is exposed more clearly when one sees U.S. continuation of the war in both zones of Vietnam and U.S. "acceleration" of the supply of weapons and war materiel to the Saigon regime. Also on the 5th, a commentary in NHAN DAN detailed the reported dispatch of helicopters, planes, and other equipment to Saigon and said the Americans are advancing the "nonsensical logic," as advanced by Pentagon spokesman Friedheim, that the war equipment is being sent "to cope with a possible cease-fire and strengthen the possibility of a cease-fire."

Another passage in the 5 November NHAN DAN commentary takes on added interest in the light of the editorial of the 8th: The commentary said that the United States seemed to have stalled the signing of the peace agreement so that an intensification of U.S. air strikes and Thieu's thousands of police operations could be carried out.

PRG STATEMENT      U.S. shipment of materiel to South Vietnam and the alleged assignment of U.S. military personnel "in the guise of 'civilian advisers'" were sharply attacked in the 8 November statement by the PRG's Foreign Ministry spokesman. The spokesman charged that "obviously, while deliberately delaying the signing of the peace agreement already reached, the Nixon Administration is making feverish preparations to prolong and intensify its war of aggression in South Vietnam." The actions of the Administration, according to the spokesman, have "again exposed its 'peace hoax.'" The spokesman concluded with a call for peoples and governments of the world to "take positive actions to stay the Nixon Administration's scheme and act of prolonging and stepping up" the war, to demand that the U.S. Government respond to the DRV and PRG statements on the peace agreement, and to "give still stronger support and assistance" to the Vietnamese resistance.

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\* Hanoi has said nothing, however, about Thuy's reported assertion in the New York TIMES' interview that "we are not creating any difficulties about a further meeting. The question is to be serious." Nor did it report his additional remark that if after another final round of talks "the United States agrees and then proposes more changes, it would be very difficult."

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## NFLSV-ALLIANCE MEETING DISCUSSES PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, FIGHTING

PRG media on 5 November announced that the NFLSV Central Committee Presidium and the Executive Committee of the Vietnam Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces (VANDPF) had held an "enlarged joint conference" on 1 and 2 November to review the "patriotic struggle" and discuss measures to "enhance national union" and step up the "offensive and uprising." Among those present at the meeting, according to LPA's report, were NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, VANDPF President Trinh Dinh Thao, and PRG President Huynh Tan Phat. Nguyen Huu Tho delivered the opening speech, Phat read a message of greetings from the PRG, Thao gave a speech, and there were several reports to the meeting, including one on the military situation by Tran Nam Trung, vice chairman of the NFLSV Presidium and PRG Defense Minister. To date none of the speeches has been released.

A communique adopted by the NFLSV-Alliance conference reviewed the military and diplomatic situation in a standard fashion. Offering the usual optimistic assessment of the fighting, the communique held that this year's offensive had fundamentally changed the balance of forces, "opening up a new situation extremely favorable to our cause." Adhering to the communist contention that their forces can fight a protracted war to final victory if necessary, the communique declared that the "armed and political forces of the revolution are fully capable of fighting hard, fighting victoriously, fighting a long drawn-out war, and advancing steadily to total victory."

Consistent with the Vietnamese communist theory that military advances must pave the way for successful negotiations, the communique maintained that the current offensive, along with the efforts of the PRG and DRV, brought the Nixon Administration into "negotiations on substance." The communists have similarly held that their victory at Dien Bien Phu created favorable conditions for the Geneva conference and that the 1968 Tet offensive compelled the United States to agree to a bombing halt and the opening of talks.

The communique praised the draft agreement on ending the war and condemned the U.S. Government for refusing to sign the agreement and asking for changes in agreed-upon provisions relating to the content of the document. It stressed the adherence of the Front and Alliance to a policy of national reconciliation and concord and declared that they were prepared to "contact and consult with

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all the political and religious forces and organizations, and all the individuals . . . who desire peace and national concord, including members of the Saigon army and administration, so as to join actions to put an early end to the war and restore peace on the basis" of the agreement. However, the communique did not discuss specific provisions in the agreement for a political solution in South Vietnam and appeared to indicate areas of dissatisfaction with the terms of the agreements by repeating such former communist stands as appeals for the urban population to press for Thieu's resignation.

Concern about the agreement's provisions on Vietnamese prisoners in South Vietnam may well have been reflected in the communique's charge that the United States and Thieu were attempting to "permanently detain," torture, and murder "patriots and freedom-loving people" whether or not they belonged to the NLFV or the Alliance. The communique went on to demand that the Saigon administration "rescind all its fascist laws, set free at once all the patriots, dismantle all disguised concentration camps such as 'strategic hamlets' and 'refugee camps,' and abolish all coercive laws and regulations, measures, and organizations against the people."

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## PEKING CRITICIZES U.S. DELAY, SHOWS CONCERN OVER ACCORD

In the aftermath of its authoritative endorsement of the 26 October DRV statement on the Vietnam negotiations, Peking mounted a major campaign in support of pressures for the United States to sign the draft accord while evincing concern lest the prospects of an early settlement fade into the indefinite future. A PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 3 November, the fourth authoritative Chinese pronouncement on a Vietnam settlement in five days,\* was more explicit than earlier commentary in questioning Washington's motives for deferring an agreement and charged that the United States is seeking substantive changes in the draft accord. An unusually prompt Chinese reaction to President Nixon's 2 November campaign address claimed that he had taken "a big step backward" in his discussion of the draft agreement and had returned to the terms of his 8 May proposal.

The Commentator article rejected the view that only minor differences now divide the two sides, arguing that the issues raised by Dr. Kissinger in his 26 October press conference are in fact "important issues of substance." It specifically cited the questions of international supervision and the relationship between the cease-fire in Vietnam and in the whole of Indochina-- issues in which Peking is more directly interested. (Peking had gone on record in the 30 October Commentator article as opposing a linkage of a cease-fire in Laos and Cambodia with a Vietnam settlement.) The article went on to cite a series of issues raised by Thieu and claimed that they dovetail with the ones pressed by the United States.

In assessing Washington's motives, Commentator charged that the "U.S. Government" is spreading "broad hints of optimism" with the aim of misleading world opinion while seeking to change the substance of the agreement. The article did not, however, relate this to the U.S. presidential election, and the 3 November NCNA reaction to the President's speech on the 2d discreetly avoided mentioning that it was a campaign address. On the other hand, Peking has recently breached its unwritten rule of scrupulously excising references to the U.S. election from Vietnamese comment attacking the Administration's approach to a Vietnam settlement.

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\* The others were the 30 October government statement and companion Commentator article supporting the DRV statement, and the 1 November editorial on Washington's failure to sign the agreement by 31 October. In the past week Peking's attention to Vietnam has accounted for more than a third of its total propaganda output.

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PROSPECTS FOR EARLY ACCORD      It could be, in fact, that the Chinese reaction to the delay in the signing of an agreement was determined in part by the imminence of the U.S. election. Registering Peking's concern that an early settlement may be slipping from reach, the 3 November Commentator article said the war will continue and peace will be "postponed indefinitely" if the United States "succeeds in its schemes" of putting off the signing of an agreement while pressing for substantive changes. Acknowledging that further negotiations are in the offing, the article stressed that a U.S. attempt to "repudiate" the agreement is "categorically impermissible."

NCNA's prompt reaction to President Nixon's 2 November address\* as a big step backward also reflected Chinese concern over a delay in firming up a settlement. NCNA contrasted this speech with the President's 20 October note to the DRV premier in which he allegedly confirmed that the formulation of the agreement could be considered complete. In charging that the President had returned to his 8 May terms, NCNA cited the issues of an Indochina-wide cease-fire and the right of South Vietnamese self-determination without the imposition of a communist or coalition government. Apart from noting that the DRV had rejected the 8 May terms, NCNA offered no comment on these issues.

There has been no authoritative Chinese comment on Vietnam since the 3 November Commentator article. In an exchange of speeches at a Peking banquet on the 6th welcoming an Albanian military delegation, the visiting Albanian defense minister mentioned the Indochina conflict but Yeh Chien-ying ignored the subject.

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\* The 3 November Commentator article was composed prior to the President's address. Chinese reaction to the President's statements on Vietnam in recent weeks had been conspicuous by its absence. Thus, Peking avoided all commentary on the President's 5 October press conference remarks, noted his nomination speech at the Republican convention on 23 August and his press conference on 29 August only with a delayed and selective replay of Vietnamese comment, followed the same practice in covering his press conference of late July, and belatedly reported on his 29 June press conference with an NCNA account on 6 July.

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## MOSCOW REMAINS CIRCUMSPECT IN URGING PEACE ACCORD SOON

Moscow's reticence in commenting on the failure to sign the U.S.-DRV peace accord was illustrated in Mazurov's generalized remarks in his 6 November speech on the October Revolution anniversary. Reflecting Moscow's continuing effort to balance the dictates of support for its allies with those of its improved relations with the United States, Mazurov failed to explicitly blame the United States for the delay in signing. He merely noted that "an agreement on the termination of the war unleashed by the United States in Vietnam" was worked out at Paris, "but this document was not signed at the date fixed." After expressing "resolute support" for "the stand of the DRV on this issue" set forth in the 26 October DRV Government statement, he simply added that "we believe that the agreement should be signed as soon as possible." By contrast, Kosygin on 27 October had expressed hope that "continued talks" would lead to agreement "soon."

Mazurov repeated routine pledges of "all-round support" to the people of Vietnam and patriots of Laos and Cambodia, recalling that their militant spirit and staunchness and the "economic, political and military aid" given them by the USSR and other socialist countries "have rendered hopeless the imperialist aggression against and diktat towards the Vietnamese people." He promised continued Soviet "help" to the Vietnamese to bring their struggle "to a successful end."

Unlike Peking, Moscow has not issued a government statement endorsing the DRV statement, although its Hungarian, East German, and Mongolian allies have done so. Some Soviet public organizations have released generalized statements calling for early signing of the agreement, and Moscow has mobilized some of its influential press commentators. The comment--including articles by Mayevskiy in PRAVDA and by Matveyev in IZVESTIYA, both on 2 November, and a NEW TIMES article by Volskiy on the 3d--has continued to charge that the United States is using Thieu's intransigence merely as an "excuse" to postpone signing the agreement. But the commentators have generally avoided placing the onus directly on the Administration, reserving their criticism for "official Washington circles," the "Pentagon," the "military-industrial complex" and the like. Many commentators have charged that the Pentagon is encouraging a delay in signing to allow time for stepped-up shipments of arms and supplies to the Saigon regime before a cease-fire.

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In this regard Mayevskiy in PRAVDA quoted the New York TIMES as citing "Washington specialists" for speculation that a cease-fire will lead not to a halt in military actions but to a guerrilla struggle. Mayevskiy commented that "U.S. militarist circles" are counting on a continuation of the war using Saigon troops.

Moscow has given minimal attention to recent statements by U.S. spokesmen. The Moscow domestic service on 3 November reported briefly that President Nixon, in his television speech the day before, "did not indicate when" the United States would sign the agreement, declaring that it had not been signed on 31 October "for the alleged reason that some points of the agreement had not been formulated." The report did not acknowledge the President's comments relating to "central points" which needed clear settlement. On 6 November TASS briefly reported that Secretary Rogers, in his television interview the previous day, expressed belief that a final understanding will be reached and that confidential talks with North Vietnam will be resumed in the near future.

#### DRV ATTENTION TO SOVIET ANNIVERSARY FOLLOWS PREVIOUS PATTERNS

The October Revolution anniversary prompted the usual messages from North Vietnamese and NFLSV/PRG leaders and the appearance at the Soviet embassy reception of all the North Vietnamese Politburo-level leaders who attended the anniversary gathering last year: Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh, Le Thanh Nghi, and Tran Quoc Hoan. The leadership lineup is appropriate for a nondecennial anniversary. With the exception of Hoan, all the Politburo members who attended the Soviet reception had also appeared at the 30 September embassy reception on Chinese National Day this year. Hoan had last appeared in public on 3 September, when he and Van Tien Dung were among those present at a memorial service for Ho Chi Minh and were identified for the first time as members of the Politburo rather than as alternate members.\*

The DRV message to the Soviet leaders closely resembled last year's and, as in the past, was signed by Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong. Le Duan has not

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\* See the 7 September 1972 TRENDS, pages 1-3.

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appeared at a public function on the October Revolution anniversary since 1967, when he traveled to Moscow for the celebrations marking the 50th anniversary. There have been few reports on the activities of the First Secretary since the start of the communist offensive in the South in late March. His last public appearances were in the last half of August and the beginning of September; before that he had met with a delegation led by Podgornyy in mid-June and with a U.S. Communist Party delegation led by Gus Hall in mid-April. The pattern of these two-month periods without any public activities is not unusual for Le Duan. Although he appeared frequently in the first months of this year and had no such lengthy absences in 1971, he was out of sight for similar extended periods in 1970--from early February to 18 April, from 8 June to early August, and from the first part of September to 12 November 1970.\*

The Soviet anniversary was also marked in editorial comment and at a "gathering" on 6 November sponsored by the Vietnam-USSR Friendship Association. In past years, "grand meetings" have been sponsored by the Vietnam Fatherland Front and the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, along with the Friendship Association. A similar reduction in the level of the anniversary meeting took place on Chinese National Day this year. As in the case of the Chinese National Day meeting, the gathering on the Soviet anniversary did not prompt an appearance of a Politburo-level representative such as used to attend the grand meetings.

#### HANOI ROUTINELY DEMOUNCES U.S. STRIKES SOUTH OF 20TH PARALLEL

U.S. raids over the North during the past week were protested routinely in daily statements by the foreign ministry spokesman. In keeping with the pattern since 25 October, the statements' listings of specific targets reflect the fact that the strikes are now confined to the area below the 20th parallel. The spokesman has continued to charge that the air strikes, together with the United States' "continued postponement" of the signing

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\* The pattern of Le Duan's appearances from 1966 through 1969 is examined in FBIS Special Report No. 297 of 10 February 1970, "Propaganda Portrayal of the DRV Party Leadership Five Months after the Death of Ho Chi Minh." Le Duan's most recent appearances are noted in the TRENDS of 7 September 1972, pages 1-3, and 30 August 1972, page 26.

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of the peace agreement, prove that "the Nixon Administration is still stubbornly prolonging the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam."

The intensified use of B-52's south of the 20th parallel during the past week was reflected in the protest statements, which specifically charged that the big planes had engaged in "carpet-bombing" and "extermination raids" on civilian targets in Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, Nghe An, and the Vinh Linh zone. The statements highlighted attacks of 1 November on the capital city of Ha Tinh; of the 2d and 6th on the port of Vinh; and of the 2d on the capital of Quang Binh Province, on the cities of Dong Hoi (also reported hit on the 7th), Ho Xa, and Nam Dan, and on a state farm in Ha Tinh which was allegedly hit again on the 5th. Coastal villages in Nghe An and in Tinh Gia district Thanh Hoa were reportedly hit in the course of heavy shelling from U.S. warships on 4 and 5 November. Four ships were claimed to have been "set ablaze" off Thanh Hoa and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone during the week, and a B-52 was alleged to have been downed over Thanh Hoa on the 5th; the loss of another F-111 on the 7th was attributed to the "armed forces and people" of Nghe An. As of 7 November, Hanoi claimed to have downed a total of 4,032 U.S. planes.

The need for militia and self-defense forces to intensify air defense activities in response to the 26 October DRV Government statement revealing the status of negotiations was spelled out in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial of 4 November. Citing the "glorious achievements" of the self-defense forces, the army paper asserted that they must continue their struggle, since "the U.S. imperialists remain extremely stubborn and crafty and continue to seek by every means to maintain colonialism in the southern part of our country and intensively strengthen the forces of their lackeys in an attempt to secure a position of strength." Declaring that "our people's perilous and violent fight continues unabated on the military, political, and diplomatic fronts" and that "the recent great victories have opened up unprecedentedly fine prospects," the editorial urged the militia and self-defense forces to maintain their vigilance, "contribute significantly" to the air defense task, and coordinate closely with the people and the security forces in crushing the enemy's psychological warfare activities and maintaining public security.

Calls for the navy, the transport forces, and DRV youth to step up their support of the frontline also appeared in both

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QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and NHAN DAN during the week. A NHAN DAN editorial of the 2d said that DRV workers--"indignant at the Nixon Administration's lack of good will or seriousness shown by its delay of the agreement"--have pledged to intensify their support to the South to defeat the "U.S. aggressors." The editorial then blasted the United States for "treacherously delaying the signing of the agreement" in order to prolong the war and seek "a negotiating position of strength."

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## USSR FOREIGN POLICY

## OCTOBER ANNIVERSARY KEYNOTER HAILS PROGRESS OF "PEACE PROGRAM"

Politburo member Kirill Mazurov, in the 6 November keynote address marking the 55th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, gave authoritative expression to the regime's optimistic assessment of recent trends in world affairs. In a speech couched in standard formulations and notable for its moderate treatment of the United States, Mazurov hailed the progress toward detente in Europe and the improvement in relations with the United States as dividends in the current Soviet "peace program," and he called for the adoption of other Soviet initiatives aimed at the normalization of international relations. Mazurov endorsed the DRV's position on a Vietnam settlement, but he avoided criticizing the United States in this connection while calling for an early settlement. It was on the China question that he struck the most discordant note, charging that Peking is pursuing an anti-Soviet policy aimed at splitting the communist movement.\*

In the survey of Moscow's relations with various countries that is standard for this occasion, Mazurov noted in particular the close ties with France and the improving relations with the FRG while conspicuously failing to mention Britain in a listing of other European countries. He cited the close relations with India, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh, but he was less committal in remarking that Soviet-Japanese relations have the "prerequisites for further all-round development."

Mazurov brushed off the Arab-Israeli conflict with a standard expression of support for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories and for recognition of the Palestinian people's legitimate rights. Again in stock terms, he insisted defensively that "imperialist forces and their accomplices" had failed to undermine Soviet-Arab friendship; he pointed to the "significance" of Egyptian Prime Minister Sidqi's recent Moscow visit in reaffirming Soviet cooperation with "progressive Arab states," adding that cooperation had also been strengthened with Syria and Iraq.

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\* Mazurov's remarks on Indochina and China are discussed in the sections on Indochina and Sino-Soviet relations in this TRENDS.

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Generally favorable observations on the international scene were balanced by reminders about the need for vigilance and for strengthening the Soviet armed forces in the face of "reactionary circles, primarily the bosses of the U.S. military-industrial complex and the NATO militarists" who are "opposing in every way the process of relaxation and are working to further the arms race." In keeping with tradition, Mazurov portrayed the capitalist world as embroiled in growing and insoluble "contradictions" in contrast to the harmony and progress said to be prevailing among the socialist countries and the "contemporary revolutionary forces." The struggle between the two systems, he maintained, was now shifting to the ideological arena as a result of the diminishing opportunities for capitalism to maneuver in the military and political spheres.

**UNITED STATES** On U.S.-Soviet relations, Mazurov characterized the Moscow summit agreements as having opened "wider prospects" for improvement of the international situation and having demonstrated that "even the most complicated international problems" can be solved by a "realistic approach." Maintaining that the Moscow talks were "fruitful" because they were based on "strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security," he went on to emphasize--without specifically mentioning SALT--that the bilateral agreements were beneficial to all states and were not reached at the expense of other states. "The main thing now," he concluded, "is to carry out consistently the agreements reached."

**EUROPE** On European security, Mazurov highlighted the Moscow and Warsaw treaties with Bonn, noting that they affirmed the principle of inviolability of postwar borders, and the quadripartite agreement on "West Berlin." Looking ahead, he declared that "the time has come to complete normalization of relations" between the GDR and the FRG, to admit them both to the United Nations, and to end international discrimination against the GDR. These remarks in part reflect the positive outcome of the Bahr-Kohl negotiations on a basic treaty between West and East Germany and the conclusion of the Big Four ambassadors' talks on a declaration reaffirming four-power rights and responsibilities in the two Germanys. In a possible signal for movement on the stalled negotiations between Bonn and Prague, Mazurov simply called for the settlement of relations between the FRG and Czechoslovakia without referring to the need to invalidate the Munich agreement--the Czechoslovak demand on which the Prague-Bonn exploratory talks have been stalled.

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Speaking on the same day that Ambassador Dobrynin delivered a Soviet note to Secretary Rogers on the timing of the conference on security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and of talks on reduction of forces in Europe, Mazurov indicated movement in this sphere by noting that "agreement in principle" on convening the CSCE "has been reached between all countries concerned." But he totally ignored the force reduction issue. Kosygin had publicly underscored the Soviet Union's concern to keep that issue separate from the CSCE in remarks during Italian Prime Minister Andreotti's visit on 24 October, the day after the NATO Council had reached agreement on an approach to the USSR on the timing of CSCE preparations and separate exploratory talks on force reductions. Declaring that the Soviet Union attached "serious significance to the reduction of armed forces and armaments, primarily in Central Europe," he called force reduction "a major independent question which merits special examination separate from the all-European conference and not linked with it." This view was endorsed jointly in the communique on the Andreotti visit issued on 29 October, two days after the United States had informed the USSR of the NATO position. The communique said both sides expressed themselves "positively" on the force reduction question and concluded that it should be examined "at a special meeting, distinct from the CSCE, and its solution should not be prejudicial to the security of the interested states."

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## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

## OCTOBER REVOLUTION OBSERVANCES REFLECT CONTINUING STALEMATE

As in the case of PRC National Day last month,\* the October Revolution anniversary provided another measure of the chronically troubled state of Sino-Soviet relations at a time when both sides are pursuing policies of detente toward most of the rest of the world. Mazurov's keynote address on 6 November conspicuously excluded China from a generally sanguine reading of Moscow's foreign relations. His ritualistic call for improved relations with the PRC was matched by a similar appeal contained in the Chinese message on the anniversary, but neither side indicated that there has been any progress in the protracted border negotiations. The talks, now in their fourth year, were not mentioned by either side.

Mazurov offhandedly noted that Peking had revised its foreign policy to escape from international isolation, but he stressed that this policy is "still based on anti-Sovietism," on a line aimed at "splitting and undermining" the international communist movement and anti-imperialist forces. He reaffirmed Moscow's intent to counter Peking's "intrigues" while seeking the normalization of relations with the PRC. Mazurov did not repeat the observation made by last year's speaker that the quest for better Sino-Soviet relations had borne some fruit.

Mazurov also failed to repeat last year's reference to defense of the Soviet Union's national interests. However, the border confrontation was reflected in a speech by the commander of the Central Asian military district at a military parade in Alma-Ata on the 7th, reported by the Alma-Ata radio. The military speaker followed a reference to the Chinese "splitters" with an assertion that the Soviets are taking all necessary measures to strengthen the country's defense, and he concluded by declaring that his troops "are always ready to destroy any aggressor and protect the sacred borders of the Soviet Union."

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\* See the TRENDS of 4 October 1972, pages 5-7.

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**CHINESE MESSAGE**      The Chinese greetings message--again addressed impersonally from the NPC Standing Committee and the State Council to their Soviet counterparts--was even more somber than last year's in reiterating a desire for normal relations based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. This year's message reaffirmed the goal of friendly and good-neighborly relations with the USSR, but it did not repeat last year's avowal that the Chinese were "deeply convinced" that this goal "will eventually" be attained. This year's message contained stronger ideological overtones, invoking the "historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat"--a theme harking back to the ideological dispute that arose in the wake of the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956--to lecture the Soviets that "it is more arduous to safeguard the fruits of revolution" than to make revolution. The message expressed support for the Soviet people in their "long, arduous, and complicated struggle to safeguard" the fruits of the October Revolution.

This line reflects the "controversies of principle" which, according to the message, should not hinder the normalization of relations. Unlike the 1971 message, this year's did not specify state relations in calling for the settlement of "important issues" between the two countries. In another change, this year's message referred to "fraternal friendship" with the Soviet people where last year's mentioned friendship without the adjective. Whatever the motive, the effect of these changes is to blur the distinction between state and party relations.

Again this year the anniversary was marked by two receptions in Peking, one given by the Soviet ambassador and the other cosponsored by the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. As in 1971, NCNA's report on the Soviet embassy reception noted the presence of the head and deputy head of the Soviet delegation at the border talks. The ranking Chinese official present was Vice Foreign Minister Yu Chan (replacing Chiao Kuan-hua, now heading the PRC delegation at the UNGA session). Unlike last year, NCNA's report this time identified the Chinese guests by their titles, but none of the Chinese was identified as a member of the negotiating team at the Sino-Soviet talks.

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## CHINA - ALBANIA

## ALBANIAN DELEGATION TAKES ISSUE WITH CHINESE STRATEGY

The arrival in Peking on 6 November of an Albanian military delegation headed by Defense Minister Balluku has served to demonstrate both Peking's solidarity with its old ally and the differences that persist between the two regarding the new Sino-U.S. relationship. On the 7th Chou En-lai and other Chinese leaders met the Albanians for "a very cordial and friendly conversation"--Peking's standard formulation for talks with close allies. Balluku and his host, Military Commission Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying, have again proclaimed the close ties between the two countries, but they have also made remarkably clear the divergence between Peking and Tirana over the Chinese decision to improve relations with the United States while viewing the Soviet Union as the prime adversary.

In his speech at a welcoming banquet for the Albanians on 6 November, Yeh echoed the line taken in the Chinese joint editorial on PRC National Day that "Soviet revisionist social imperialism" is "more deceptive than old-line imperialism" and "therefore more dangerous." Yeh cited the Soviets first in attacking the two superpowers for seeking global hegemony. Balluku reversed the order in denouncing the United States and the Soviet Union, and he took direct issue with Yeh's line by insisting that each of the two "is as dangerous as the other." Pressing the point home, he declared that people of "all" countries "must not harbor the slightest illusion about them."

Characteristically, the Albanian subordinated the "contradictions" between the two superpowers to their alleged collusion "in the form of the notorious Soviet-U.S. alliance." More evenhandedly, Yeh observed that the two superpowers "both contend and collude" with each other. He made no reference to a Soviet-U.S. alliance--a theme that dropped out of Chinese comment as Peking evolved the strategy of relaxing tensions with the United States and other adversaries in order to gain leverage against the Soviet Union as the primary enemy.

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The divergence between Peking and Tirana over the proper approach to the big-power triangular relationship has focused on this key element of Peking's strategy. Albanian party chief Hoxha had discoursed polemically on the need for an unrelenting anti-U.S. posture in his report to his party congress last year.\* In effect rejecting Peking's rationale for its invitation to President Nixon, Hoxha insisted that the United States "remains the chief enemy" and that any relaxation of the anti-U.S. struggle would be "full of dangerous consequences." Most pointedly, he argued that it is not possible "to use one imperialism in order to oppose the other" because the two superpowers pursue a common global strategy.

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\* See the TRENDS of 3 November 1971, pages 18-21.

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## YUGOSLAVIA - USSR

## BELGRADE DENIES PURGE SIGNALS ALINEMENT TOWARD SOVIET BLOC

Belgrade has evinced sensitivity to West European speculation that the current purge of liberals in the LCY may signal a shift away from nonalinement and toward the East--speculation apparently fed by favorable coverage of the purge in Soviet media and by the evidently successful visit to Yugoslavia of a high-powered Soviet economic delegation led by Deputy Premier Novikov.

In a 5 November talk, the free-wheeling Zagreb radio commentator Milika Sundic scored an article in the Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA for suggesting that a Soviet loan to Yugoslavia, concluded during Novikov's visit, was a "political loan." Sundic took the Milan paper to task for conjecturing that the recent "actions by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and particularly by President Tito, are taken on somebody else's behalf and for somebody else's benefit" and that "nonalinement is allegedly experiencing a crisis and Yugoslavia is turning toward the East." Two days earlier, Sundic had been similarly defensive in insisting that Belgrade was not now "returning to the left or the right" any more than it did "when things were much more difficult," presumably in the years after 1948 or in 1968. He added that "nobody imposed on us either democratic centralism in the party or self-management or a nonalined foreign policy orientation." In both talks, Sundic warned the dissenters--"anarcholiberals, Cominformists, Rankovicites," and "other forces of the class enemy"--that there would be "no second chance" for them and that the purge would be pursued energetically.

On the 4th, a radio commentary by Kocovic denounced "anti-Yugoslav activity through psychological pressure and an incorrect depiction of events" from such sources as West German TV, the FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, and the Belgian daily LE SOIR.

The purge on the 3d claimed its most prominent victim to date with the resignation of Koca Popovic, a partisan associate of Tito in World War II and a former foreign minister, as one of the three Serbian members of the 23-member Yugoslav collective "presidency."

## ECONOMIC TALKS

The Soviet loan cited in Sundic's talk was not directly mentioned in Radio Moscow's report of the Belgrade economic negotiations. TANJUG on the 2d noted "a

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Soviet credit of 540 million soft currency dollars at a two-percent rate of interest" for construction and reconstruction of Yugoslav industrial projects. Moscow's reports hailed the "cooperation agreement" in general terms and stressed that at the ninth session of the two countries' Intergovernmental Committee on Economic Cooperation, held 26 October to 2 November in Belgrade, it was noted that Soviet-Yugoslav economic cooperation "is developing successfully in keeping with the all-round development of relations between the two friendly socialist countries on the basis of the principles affirmed" during Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia in September 1971. The 25 September 1971 joint statement had said the intergovernmental committee would "study all possibilities and take the necessary steps with a view to an even more efficient and rapid development" of bilateral economic ties. The reports on the latest session said the two countries' representatives "confirmed their interest in long-term mutual deliveries of some basic raw materials." The issue of Soviet long-term deliveries of raw materials is still unsolved between the USSR and its more orthodox trading partner, Hungary.

Speeches at the windup of the Belgrade economic talks were predictably divergent on the broader significance of the agreements. Soviet Deputy Premier Vladimir Novikov viewed them as manifesting the goal of the CPSU and Soviet Government to "create as strong a cohesion as possible between the Soviet people and the peoples of the socialist countries," strengthen friendship, and broaden "political, economic, ideological, and cultural" ties, thus promoting the welfare of "the whole socialist community." His opposite number, Yugoslav Federal Executive Council Vice President Jakov Sirotkovic, hewed for the most part to the bilateral economic significance of the agreements, adding only that they contributed also to "the all-round expansion of friendly relations between our two socialist countries."

**PRAVDA ON PURGE** A lengthy dispatch in the 1 November PRAVDA by the paper's Belgrade correspondent V. Zhuravskiy is Moscow media's fullest account to date of the recent Yugoslav political developments. Moscow's earlier practice of carrying only cryptic reports of the "resignations" had been broken on 31 October when TASS publicized some details of Tito's speech at the LCY Presidium meeting on Brioni the preceding day. The Zhuravskiy dispatch dealt further with Tito's speech as well as with his letter sent to all LCY members and organizations in early October. It quoted the Belgrade weekly KOMUNIST to the effect that the letter "launched the League of Communists into a struggle to change the situation where negative phenomena exist" and that "this is not a declaration but a call to action!"

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The PRAVDA dispatch wound up on a clearly approving note, saying that "every day reports from all the republics contain news of support for the course defined in the letter from the LCY President and the LCY Presidium Executive Bureau and in Josip Broz Tito's speeches" and of the Yugoslav communists' readiness to "struggle actively" to implement this course.

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## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

### SHCHERBITSKIY ASSAILS FOES OF ECONOMIC CONTROL FROM MOSCOW

In a 31 October PRAVDA article Ukrainian First Secretary V.V. Shcherbitskiy stressed the "internationalization" of the economies of Soviet republics and assailed those who are more concerned about republic than about national interests. Shcherbitskiy's remarks may have been partially aimed at his predecessor, P. Ye. Shelest, who appeared to defend Ukrainian economic interests in 1971.

Shcherbitskiy declared that "our foes" are trying to sow doubt about the need to further deepen economic ties between republics and are bringing up the "poisonous" idea of unequal economic relationships. He recalled that the Donbas industry was rebuilt in the 1920's through a national effort directed by Moscow and argued that just as other regions had helped the Ukraine build its industry in the past, so a national effort--implicitly including the Ukraine--is needed now for regional economic development. He cited as an example the development of Tyumen's petroleum industry. Shcherbitskiy warned that any attempt to slow down further "internationalization" and "take the path of national exclusiveness" would cause "great harm."

Shelest at the 24th CPSU Congress had complained of underdevelopment of the Donbas coal mines and criticized those who asserted that investments in gas and oil should be raised while cutting back the less efficient coal production. He maintained that the coal industry and "especially the Donetsk coal basin" must also be developed, and subsequently a special Central Committee-Council of Ministers decree increased investments in the Donbas coal mines.\*

### IZVESTIYA CONFIRMS SHIFT OF RESOURCES TO AGRICULTURE

A 31 October IZVESTIYA editorial on the recent Central Committee-Council of Ministers decree on land improvement has provided the first confirmation of a redistribution of resources as a result of this year's agricultural setbacks. A summary of the decree, published on 28 October, did not mention new investments, complaining instead that past investments were not being fully used. However,

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\* See the TRENDS of 28 June 1972, pages 41-42.

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IZVESTIYA's editorial said that "the government considers possible a certain redistribution of material resources between branches in favor of the land improvement workers," who, "as indicated in the decree," will receive more new equipment and fertilizer.

Recent press articles have been stressing the role of Brezhnev's 1966 land improvement program in softening the effects of this year's drought, and the decree stated that the drought had increased the need for irrigation and drainage work. IZVESTIYA's editorial declared polemically that "no one can now doubt that investments in land improvement are effective and necessary."

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## CHINA

## RED FLAG ARTICLE ENCOURAGES BALANCED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Cultural revolution policies have been significantly revised in regard to priorities in the economic sector, with light industry gaining considerably since Lin Piao's downfall and the emphasis in agriculture shifting from an all-out push for expanded grain production back to a recognition of the importance of subsidiary crops. These measures have probably served to win support from consumers, who now have a wider selection of goods, and from farmers who can make more money on nongrain crops. An article in RED FLAG No. 10, broadcast by Honan radio on 20 October, reaffirmed these priorities, holding up Honan as an example of an agricultural province which has made rapid strides in industry because of attention to agriculture. The article claimed that the province's output of agricultural products for industry has now doubled as compared with the pre-cultural revolution period. It said the development of medium and small-scale industries led to the realization "through practice" that industrial development must be based on agricultural development. According to the policy outlined, priority is now given "to agriculture, light industry, and heavy industry in that order" and no materials earmarked for agriculture are allowed to be diverted.

Marking a decided departure from policy during the cultural revolution, when Liu Shao-chi was attacked for closing down small enterprises operated by the people, the RED FLAG article observed that closing some enterprises of this sort "is not retrogressive but positive and progressive." The article firmly stated that local industry must be compatible with the local resource base; agricultural industries "should be proportionate to agricultural development" and should rely on local mineral resources, including iron and steel. Noting "some regions' failure" to correctly handle the problem of building up an industrial system gradually upon an expanding material base, the article revealed that small local industries "whose raw materials, fuel, and electric power were not definitely available . . . were not allowed to continue their building."

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**PRIORITY IN MINING SHIFTS FROM EXTRACTION TO PREPARATION**

A recent spate of articles on mining provides further evidence that China is extending the moderate and balanced economic policies now in favor. The articles stress that preparation for future returns is as important as current ore extraction and must be accorded priority, a decided switch from the cultural revolution practice of promoting current output.

A short commentary in PEOPLE'S DAILY on 9 October laid down the policy of giving priority to preparatory tunneling and stripping rather than to ore extraction. The commentary complained that "the erroneous idea of stressing ore extraction and belittling tunneling is found not only at grassroots units but at higher levels." Leading organs were told to demand that both extraction and tunneling tasks be fulfilled and that mines which had lagged behind in tunneling in the past should now place "special emphasis" on it. Blame for past mistakes was placed on the "few leading organizations" which had called for more attention to ore extraction than to tunneling and had allowed mines charged with urgent extraction tasks to devote all their efforts to it. The commentary and accompanying articles pointed out that a stable high output is impossible without preparations assuring continuous supplies.

The proportion of effort to be expended on preparatory tunneling and details of the problems caused by insufficient tunneling were discussed in a 19 October Peking broadcast recounting the experiences of a Shantung coal mine. In 1961, "influenced by Liu Shao-chi," the mine had stressed excavation rather than tunneling, and "the tunnels which should have been dug were not opened and the work faces that should have been ready were not prepared." As a result excavation workers had to be sent to do preparation, and shaft output "always lagged behind designed capacity." The article advised that balanced production is necessary and that usually mines should maintain a six-month supply of coal already evacuated, prepare easily evacuated ore seams a year in advance, and have proven deposits for another three to five years.

One theme running through the mining articles as well as others urging pragmatic economic policies is the emphasis placed on the role of old workers and technicians. A short commentary in the

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19 October PEOPLE'S DAILY stated that in mining the leading groups should be "augmented by enlisting those cadres who have worked in the mine for years." The article noted that as long as one can sum up experiences and apply them to new practices, he can better handle problems, including how best to implement the policy of giving priority to tunneling. A Shenyang radio broadcast on 18 October related how one mining team sent experienced workers to another team to help it raise the quality of its work.

A commentary praising old cadres in the Tayah iron mine, broadcast by Peking on 19 October, broached another general issue in raising the question of setting production quotas. Reversing a trend of several years, the commentary lauded a unit for not seeking to exceed its previous year's record production. "Production of a mine is governed by laws unique to itself," the broadcast explained. In the case publicized, a change in mine conditions led experienced veteran cadres in the mine to urge a reduction in the quota from the all-time high the year before. Though the reduction was resisted not only within the mine but at higher levels, the cadres' arguments finally carried the day and have proven to be in line with the actual production thus far this year.

#### MODIFIED CAMPAIGN TO SEND YOUTH TO COUNTRYSIDE PUBLICIZED

Another area registering a shift from cultural revolution extremes since Lin's downfall embraces policies affecting the education, job training, and work assignments of youth. Not only is this an area closely identified with cultural revolution policies, but the question of rural assignments for youth has become particularly sensitive since the central authorities circulated documentation of Lin's misdeeds which included an attack on Mao for sending youth to the countryside on a massive scale during the cultural revolution. A current drive to encourage 1972 middle school graduates to go to the countryside serves to show the leadership's support for a characteristic Maoist program while at the same time offering concessions to make it more palatable.

An article in RED FLAG No. 10, published also in PEOPLE'S DAILY on 10 October, took note of the charge attributed to Lin by denouncing efforts by "swindlers"--Lin and his followers--to disrupt the movement to the countryside by labeling it as "labor reform in disguise." While stressing the value of having youth acquire

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"practical" experience with peasants and workers, the article reflected a benign attitude toward youth by observing that "young people are different from adults in character." Therefore, it said, "in our work we cannot treat them the same way." Mao himself was quoted as noting the importance of rest and recreation.

An 18 October commentary in both WEN HUI PAO and LIBERATION DAILY noted that sending urban youth to rural areas not only facilitated the Maoist goal of reducing peasant-worker differences, but also "accelerated the pace of socialist revolution and construction." The commentary acknowledged that "it is not always smooth sailing" for youth in the country, but it said that they must learn to surmount all kinds of difficulties. Another commentary in the two newspapers on 21 October focused on cadre peasants, who were urged to "encourage" their children to follow the call of the party and state--"which have trained our children to become middle school students"--and to go to the countryside or border areas.

Although the rustication program has been curtailed to include only graduates and has been made voluntary, the regime is still faced with resistance from the educated youth and their cadre parents. There is an apparent attempt to make use of Red Guard activists as examples for others to follow. A 24 October Shanghai radio account of the departure of the first group of 1,000 to go to Heilungkiang this year stated that many were Red Guard cadres and activists who had "relentlessly criticized swindlers like Liu Shao-chi who made malicious remarks against young intellectuals going to the countryside." To enhance their image as young heroes and to encourage emulation, the group was seen off with a 10-mile parade watched by 300,000 admirers.

A Harbin broadcast on 6 October explained the importance of the recently settled youth to the province's development: 15,000 had been admitted to the party, more than that number had become cadres, and 167,000 had joined the YCL. The youth were not restricted to agriculture, but also furnished an educated class from which teachers, propagandists, barefoot doctors, machine operators, and accountants have been drawn.

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These rewards and opportunities have apparently not solved the problem of youth yearning to return to urban areas, however. An article which appeared in KWANGMING DAILY on 4 October, written by a commune in Kirin, noted that the selection of some of the rusticated youths for colleges, industry, and the PLA has produced "mental anxiety" among those left behind as to "whether or not they may have such an opportunity to leave the countryside."

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## CHINA-THAILAND

### THAI MISSION'S VISIT DEMONSTRATES WARMING RELATIONS

Peking contributed further to the warmer atmosphere surrounding Sino-Thai relations and underlined its interest in improved ties with Bangkok by extending a forthcoming welcome last month to the first Thai economic delegation to visit China. A Thai delegation had been expected to visit this fall's Canton trade fair in response to an invitation extended to Prasit Kanchanawat, an important Thai official who accompanied the Thai table tennis team on its unprecedented visit to Peking to take part in the Asian table tennis tournament last September.\* Peking reported on 18 October that a 16-man Thai economic mission had arrived in the capital following a stay at the Canton fair for a visit at the invitation of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade.

During its six days in Peking, the delegation was honored at banquets hosted by PRC foreign trade officials, toured historical sites, and saw a drama performance. NCNA reported on 22 October that the entire group was met by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and had a "friendly conversation." Following its departure from Peking, the group was treated to a tour of south China before its return home.

Peking's treatment of the delegation's visit marked an advance over that accorded Prasit, whose talks with Chou En-lai and some other Chinese officials were reported in completely neutral terms by NCNA. The warmer treatment compares with Peking's coverage of the visit in May 1971 of the first Malaysian trade delegation in the PRC--a visit that marked an important breakthrough in Sino-Malaysian relations.\*\*

NCNA's reports on the Thai mission's visit were promptly carried in full in Peking's broadcasts to Thailand. In addition, the PRC-based clandestine radio station of the Thai Communist Party, the "Voice of the People of Thailand" (VOPT), repeated NCNA's account of Li Hsien-nien's meeting with the group. However, Peking's

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\* Prasit's visit is discussed in the 20 September 1972 TRENDS, page 42.

\*\* The Malaysian group's visit is discussed in the 1 September 1971 TRENDS, page 34.

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warmer relations with Bangkok have been reflected in a widening divergence between its own comment on Thailand and that offered by the VOPT--a pattern evidenced earlier in Peking's treatment of Malaysia and Burma as compared with propaganda from communist clandestine stations beamed to those countries. Thus, while the VOPT has continued to denounce Thai government policies and to excoriate the "Thanom-Praphat clique," Peking in its own name has not directly referred to Bangkok's actions or criticized the regime since Prasit's visit in September. Peking's coverage has been restricted to selective replays of VOPT commentary that has been sanitized to remove attacks on the Thanom government by name,

Notwithstanding the current signs of forward movement in Sino-Thai relations, sensitive bilateral problems have recently been alluded to publically by both sides. Thai officials have confessed to the press in Bangkok that they remain skeptical of Peking's intentions toward the communist insurgents in the country and have not been reassured by Chou En-lai's ambiguous assertion to Prasit that Peking will not interfere in Thai internal affairs but will nevertheless continue to support people fighting for freedom. For its part, Peking may have been indirectly broaching a sensitive dispute with Bangkok by means of a 22 October VOPT broadcast that criticized the Thanom government for continuing to allow the remnant 93d Kuomintang division to maintain a presence in North Thailand near the China border. The broadcast charged that despite their official status as "refugees" of the Chinese civil war, the troops remain an organized military force having ties with Taipei.

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